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Abstract: 
 
This paper focuses on residential sorting by social and ethnic status in large French urban 
areas. Three major determinants of segregation are stressed in the economic literature (i) 
Alonso sorting based on distance, due to the trade-off between land consumption and 
accessibility to the central city, (ii) sorting based on local households’ income, due to the taste 
for endogenous amenities produced by residents’ income and (iii) Tiebout sorting over 
jurisdictions, due to the taste for local public goods. The last two mechanisms result in an 
interjurisdictional sorting according to jurisdiction’s average household income while the first 
one leads to a radioconcentric sorting. Our objective is to assess the relative importance of 
these two types of sorting. Our methodology draws on Schmidheiny (2006). First, a 
conditional logit model is estimated for each urban area, in which moving households are 
assumed to sort based on jurisdictions’ distance to the central city and jurisdictions’ mean 
household income (as a proxy for the level of endogenous amenities and local public goods). 
Second, our estimation results are used to simulate the counterfactual residential patterns that 
would prevail if, alternatively, one or the other of these segregation channels were inactive. 
The contribution of the two types of sorting to the social and ethnic segregation is finally 
appreciated by comparing the values of dissimilarity indexes computed on the basis of the 
observed and counterfactual residential distributions of households. Interjurisdictional sorting 
based on income emerges as the primary cause of social segregation among wage-earning 
households. On the contrary, Alonso-type sorting appears to be the main driver of segregation 
between economically active and inactive households, as well as between French-citizen and 
Foreign-citizen households.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Residential segregation by income and ethnicity is a major feature of contemporary Western 
cities (see e.g. Card et al., 2008; Wheeler, LaJeunesse, 2008) and is generally considered to be 
undesirable. It may be the source of poverty traps due for instance to peer effects in education 
and lack of role models. It may weaken social cohesion and redistribution mechanisms 
(Bjorvatn and Capellen, 2003). In short, segregation may be the source of short-term as well 
as long-term inequalities and social tensions.  
 
In the United States, at least for fifty years, economists have been trying to explain residential 
sorting by income in American metropolitan areas. Two main strands of literature are 
competing to this purpose. The urban economic literature, originally based on the Alonso 
(1964), Mills (1967) and Muth (1969) model of a monocentric city, suggests a 
radioconcentric sorting. Extensions stress the role of endogenous amenities (Brueckner, 
Thisse and Zenou, 1999). The local public finance literature rooted in Tiebout’s (1956) model 
of fiscal competition suggest a sorting across jurisdictions that indirectly contributes to the 
understanding of urban configurations. To improve the understanding of income sorting, an 
integrated modelling approach is clearly required (Nechyba and Walsh, 2004) and has only 
been intended recently (Bartolome and Ross, 2003, 2004, 2007; Epple, Gordon, Sieg, 2010).  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to this integrated approach on the basis of an 
empirical analysis of residential choices and their impact on urban segregation. Our objective 
is to assess empirically the relative contributions of interjurisdictional sorting based on 
income and radioconcentric sorting to social and ethnic segregation in 37 large French urban 
areas. Similar to what is observed in other industrialized countries, French urban areas, that 
host 77% of the French population in 1999, have been continuously sprawling since the 
sixties and residential segregation by income and ethnicity is commonly acknowledged as a 
striking issue (Fitoussi et al., 2004; Gobillon and Selod, 2007; Pan Ké Shon, 2009). In this 
context, improving our understanding of the causes and consequences of households’ location 
decisions within French urban areas is obviously of great political relevance, in particular 
because political answers to segregation are not the same whether it is due to Alonso-like, 
Tiebout-like or amenity-related mechanisms.  
 
This inquiry requires the empirical analysis of residential location choices, in terms of 
distance to the central city and local economic conditions, as a function of households’ 
income and ethnicity. The literature interested in this question mainly relies on housing price 
hedonic estimations aimed at estimating willingness to pay for accessibility and local 
amenities. Nevertheless, some recent works use discrete choice modeling. For instance, 
Ioannides and Zanella (2008) analyze the demand for neighborhood "quality" in contrasting 
location choices of households with and without children. Schmidheiny (2006) focuses on the 
impact of local progressive income taxes on location choices in Switzerland. Bayer and 
McMillan (2012) estimate a rich residential location choice model in which housing 
characteristics, neighborhood ethnic composition and neighborhood income are accounted 
for.  
 
We follow the methodology proposed by Schmidheiny (2006) and also used in Bayer, 
McMillan (2012). The approach consists in two steps. In a first step, we estimate on each of 
the 37 urban areas a conditional logit model of residential location choice, in which 
households are supposed to select a community depending on their income interacted with 
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distance to the central city and mean income of potential destinations. The specific advantage 
associated with relocating close to one’s former community is also taken into account through 
a specific former location dummy. This advantage is due to better information about housing 
supply, lower moving costs, access to previously built local social networks, etc. Because 
considering all the communities of an urban area as potential destinations in the location 
choice set would give far too many alternatives in the logit model, we built a smaller location 
choice set by grouping jurisdictions according to their mean household income and distance 
to the central city in 1990. As households’ incomes are not directly available in our data, 
occupational status is used as a proxy. Ethnicity is also accounted for. Our sample 
encompasses all migrations that occurred between 1990 and 1999 within 37 urban areas of 
more than 200,000 inhabitants and contains 210,611 households.  
 
In a second step, social and ethnic dissimilarity indexes of migrants are calculated for each 
urban area either with the observed household distribution or with counterfactual household 
distributions predicted based on the estimated conditional logit model. The relative 
importance of the two “segregation channels” stressed above – i.e. the choice of distance to 
the central city and of neighborhood average income – can be disentangled by predicting 
distributions of households across types using only the coefficients of our model associated 
with either the choice of distance to the central city or the choice of location average income. 
 
Our main results are the following. Income-related amenities are clearly strong determinants 
of location choices: segregation among the economically active social groups appears to be 
mainly driven by the income channel, especially for the most affluent social group. 
Nevertheless, segregation between economically active and inactive households is mainly 
explained by distance, as predicted by the standard urban economic model. Regarding ethnic 
segregation, the distance channel dominates the income one, but both of them are dominated 
by the inertia of the previously prevailing segregated pattern.  
 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background and the 
hypotheses of our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical model. Section 4 
describes the data, the sample definition and a few descriptive statistics. Results are presented 
in the last section. 
 
 
2. Background, theoretical model and overview of the empirical approach 
 
2.1. Background 
 
In the urban economic literature, sorting over space is driven by households’ tastes for land 
and accessibility to jobs. In the standard monocentric city model, jobs are all in the central 
business district (CBD), so that a location closer to the CBD has the advantage of lower 
commuting costs but – due to land market competition – the inconvenient of higher land 
prices. Both land and accessibility to jobs are normal goods. Rich households have a high 
land consumption and thus are more strongly attracted than the poor by low land prices. 
However, they also have a high opportunity cost of time, so that they value more accessibility 
to jobs than the poor. Sorting between rich and poor households depends on the value of the 
income elasticity of commuting costs relative to the value of the income elasticity of the 
demand for land. If the former is higher than the latter, then the accessibility effect dominates 
and the rich households outbid the poor households for locations closer to the CBD. If, on the 
contrary, the former is lower than the latter, then the land consumption effect dominates and 
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the rich households tend to live further to the CDB than the poor households. This case is 
supposed to explain the commonly observed urban pattern in the United States. In both cases, 
the model displays a monotonic relationship between households’ income and distance from 
the CBD (Wheaton, 1977) and produces income sorting according to distance to the CBD.  
 
The basic monocentric model has been extended to account for exogenous amenities and, 
more important, for endogenous amenities. In Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999) (BTZ in 
the following) model, income sorting is due to the conventional forces of the monocentric city 
model, but also to the households’ tastes for urban amenities. Urban amenities are of three 
kinds: natural, historical and modern. “While natural and historical amenities are largely 
exogenous, modern amenities are endogenous, with their levels depending on the current 
economic conditions in a neighborhood, especially the local income levels. Such amenities 
might include restaurants, theaters, and modern public facilities such as swimming pools and 
tennis courts.” (Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou, 1999, p.94). The authors make the traditional 
assumption that the conventional location forces drive the rich to the suburbs and the poor to 
the city center (i.e. the income elasticity of commuting costs is lower than the income 
elasticity of land demand). They show that if the center’s exogenous amenity advantage is 
sufficiently large, the equilibrium outcome can be reversed: the rich households outbid the 
poor households for locations in the city center. This additional location force could be at the 
origin of the differences between US and European cities. Europe’s longer history and 
differences in government investment in central city infrastructures is likely to explain the 
differences in the spatial pattern of exogenous amenities. In addition, modern endogenous 
amenities introduce the possibility of multiple equilibria: they make the existing location of 
the rich attractive to them wherever it might be. This possibility may help explain the variety 
of location patterns by income observed in reality.  
 
A different explanation of income sorting in cities has been provided by the local public 
finance literature. In this kind of models, income sorting across jurisdictions is driven by 
households’ tastes for public amenities. In the original Tiebout’s model, local amenities are 
the level of public goods produced by jurisdictions. The level of public good is a normal 
good, which means that its demand increases with income. Households with different income 
look for different public good levels and thus choose different jurisdictions, each household 
choosing the jurisdiction which provides his preferred public service level. Assuming that 
jurisdictions are formed on a featureless plain, that jurisdictional boundaries may be freely 
adjusted, and that the public good is financed by a head-tax and a households’ income does 
not depend on the jurisdiction in which it resides, then income stratification across 
jurisdictions should be perfect at long-term equilibrium (Tiebout, 1956). This jurisdictional 
sorting is a potential source of suburbanization, as people move to suburban jurisdictions to 
get their desired level of public services.  
 
The local public finance framework has been extended to take account of other location 
choice determinants. Some extensions specifically aim at explaining suburbanization and the 
well-known US urban pattern displaying rich households in suburbs and poor households in 
central cities. The implied amenities can be divided into factors that pull rich white 
households into the suburbs and factors that push them out of city centers (Nechyba and 
Walsh, 2004). From the pull-side, sprawl can be explained by the possibility of implementing 
zoning regulations in suburban jurisdictions to exclude those supposed to bring with them 
negative fiscal externalities (free riding on tax payments, etc.) or peer externalities (crime 
rates, school qualities, etc.). The push-side corresponds to the “flight from blight” hypothesis 
(Jackson, 1985; Mills and Lubuele, 1997): rich households move from the central city to 
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suburban jurisdictions in order to flee the negative externalities produced by poor households 
(high crime rates, low school quality, general fiscal distress, etc). More generally, literature on 
neighborhood externalities stresses that the demand for the “quality” of the neighborhood 
social composition – in terms of positive externalities for access to employment and human 
capital accumulation for instance – is linked to the local income level and generates income 
segregation (Benabou, 1993; Durlauf, 2004; Ioannides and Zabel, 2008; Ioannides and 
Zanella; 2008). 
 
As stressed by Bartolome and Ross (2003), the predictions of public finance models and 
urban economic models are hardly supported by facts: income sorting between jurisdictions is 
far from perfect; empirical estimations suggest that the income elasticity of commuting costs 
is greater than the income elasticity of land demand (Wheaton, 1977; Glaeser, Kahn and 
Rappaport, 2000); and the relationship between households’ income and distance from the 
CBD does not appear to be monotonic in general (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000). An 
integrated model that better matches empirical facts was developed by Bartolome and Ross 
(2003, 2004, 2007; BR model hereafter). This is a model of a monocentric city with 
jurisdictions providing public services. Households sort over jurisdictions based on 
conventional location forces and public service levels. The level of public services in a 
jurisdiction is decided by majority voting and rich households must be the majority to be able 
to implement their preferred level of local public goods. When it is not the case, they tend to 
vote with their feet for jurisdictions with high public service levels. Income elasticity of 
commuting costs is now assumed to be greater than the income elasticity of land demand, but 
rich households may nevertheless settle in the suburb because of the higher public good level 
there. Therefore, the model is able to predict complete as well as partial income sorting 
between jurisdictions and across space, and the relationship between households’ income and 
distance from the CBD may be, or not, monotonic, depending on households tastes for local 
public goods and of the unitary commuting time. 
 
2.2. Segregation mechanisms in French urban areas 
 
In this article, our objective is to assess empirically the relative contribution of Alonso sorting 
and interjurisdiction sorting (due to endogenous amenities and Tiebout-like mechanisms) to 
social and ethnic segregation in 37 large French urban areas. Our empirical framework relies 
upon a few important assumptions. Put in a nutshell, we assume that within urban areas, 
households sort across locations primarily on the basis of location distance to the central city 
and jurisdiction average household income. Due to data constraints, we however do not focus 
on sorting by income but on sorting by occupational category. 
 
More precisely, we first assume that these urban areas are essentially monocentric in terms of 
employment. Considering French urban areas in 1999, we know that central cities contain 
27.2% of the total employed population but 41.5% of total jobs (Julien, 2001). Secondly, 
following BTZ and BR, we assume that households sort across jurisdictions (or 
municipalities) both according to their preferred accessibility to the central city (resulting 
from their tastes for land consumption and accessibility to jobs) and their preferred level of 
modern amenities. The amenities supposed here to be relevant regarding households’ location 
decisions are the jurisdiction’s endogenous modern amenities, including notably public good 
provision and the externalities related to the population composition. Thirdly, we make 
important assumptions about proxies. Modern amenities are assumed to be well proxied by 
the jurisdictions’ average income: high-income jurisdictions offer high quality public and 
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private services, positive peer externalities, etc. Accessibility to the central city is assumed to 
be well proxied by the jurisdictions’ bird’s eye distances to the central city.  
 
Finally, we also account for the more traditional Alonso-type mechanisms by considering 
family size as a determinant of distance choices.  
 
2.3. Methodology overview 
 
Our methodology draws on Schmidheiny (2006), who studies the impact of local progressive 
income taxes on households’ location choices and income sorting in the city of Basel, 
Switzerland. This methodology is in two steps. The first step consists in the estimation of a 
conditional logit model of households’ location decisions, one for each the 37 urban areas 
considered in our study. For each urban area, we consider a 1/20 sample of households that 
moved within the urban area between 1990 and 1999 (all urban areas together, there are 
210,611 households in our sample). The choice set of each moving household is defined on 
the basis of all jurisdictions included in the urban area in 1999. However, in urban areas of 
more than 200,000 inhabitants, considering all jurisdictions as potential destinations would 
give far too many alternatives for estimating a conditional logit model and hence we group 
jurisdictions of each urban area according to their distances to the central city and to their 
average income in 1990. The choice set finally contains 17 classes of jurisdictions. The 
characteristics of these classes are computed as averages over their municipalities. 
 
The main explanatory variables of location choices are interactions between households’ 
characteristics and characteristics of the location (defined as one of the 17 classes the 
municipality belongs to). On one hand, we interact either the social or the ethnic status of 
households with the class mean distance to the central city. On the other hand, we interact 
either the social or the ethnic status of households with the location class mean household 
income. Importantly, the income taken into account is measured in 1990, i.e. before migration 
took place. Indeed, as stressed by the BZT model, modern amenities are endogenous: they are 
both a cause and consequence of the location patterns of different income groups. There is a 
simultaneity issue that we try to limit in our econometric model by taking the past value of 
location income.  
 
The second step relies on predicted location choices and segregation measures. For each 
urban area, we can easily measure the observed level of segregation by social and ethnic 
status across classes of jurisdictions of moving households, based on the computation of 
dissimilarity indexes. Then, for each urban area, we can use the coefficients obtained in our 
first step estimation to predict the counterfactual location pattern of these households and 
measure the predicted level of segregation by social and ethnic status across classes. By 
comparing the observed and predicted segregation levels, we are able to assess the prediction 
power of our model, thus the joint explanatory power of income-based sorting and Alonso-
sorting mechanisms. Furthermore, the relative importance of these two “segregation 
channels” can be disentangled. Indeed, for each urban area, we can select the coefficients 
associated with explanatory variables corresponding to one segregation channels only 
(interactions with classes’ distances only or with classes’ mean incomes only), setting all the 
other coefficients to zero, and predict the corresponding counterfactual location patterns of 
households across classes. We can thus measure and compare the predicted level of 
segregation due to income-based sorting and that due to Alonso-type sorting. A third 
“segregation channel” is also included in our model, namely, the specific advantages of 
relocating nearby one’s former location. These advantages may be due to better information 
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about housing supply, lower moving costs, access to previously built local social networks, 
etc. We expect that moving households are more likely to choose to relocate nearby their 
former location rather than elsewhere, and that the segregated pattern prevailing in 1990 is 
partly translated to 1999 due to this additional effect.  
 
3. Data and sample definition 
 
Before to expose the econometric model in detail in section 4, we present in this section our 
data and the variables used in the estimations. We also give a few descriptive statistics 
concerning location classes, that constitute the explained variable of our model, as well as the 
sample statistics.  
 
3.1. Data 
 
Our empirical investigation is mainly based on the 1999 French Population Census (produced 
by INSEE, the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Study). A 1/20
th
 sample 
is drawn from the Census, in which detailed characteristics of households and their members 
are available. Residential location of these households at the municipality level is known in 
1999 and 1990, allowing to trace households' moves. Unfortunately, households’ incomes are 
not. We will therefore make use of the occupational status of the household's reference person 
as a proxy for household's income.  
 
As to location characteristics, our analysis requires information on municipality average 
household income as well as jurisdiction's distances to the employment center of the urban 
area. The mean households’ incomes of each Commune (i.e. French jurisdiction) comes from 
the French Tax Authorities (INSEE/DGI). The French National Geographic Institute (IGN) 
provides the geographic coordinates of each Commune’s town hall, allowing to compute the 
straight-line distance between the Commune's townhall and the center of the urban area. Other 
characteristics of locations are taken from the 1999 Population Census aggregated at the 
Commune level.  
 
In the descriptive statistics, we also make use of data from the French and the Parisian notary 
societies (PERVAL, Chambre des notaires de Paris) giving mean housing prices in 2002.  
 
3.2. Choice of urban areas and definition of the location choice set 
 
Our study is aimed at explaining location choices within urban areas, that is, in labor-market 
areas within which households are assumed to choose their residential location considering 
their workplace as given. Urban areas are defined in France based on commuting flows as 
measured in 1999 from Census data. An urban area comprises a city center and inner suburbs 
comprising several municipalities and a ring of outer suburbs composed of municipalities that 
do not belong to the urban unit but which are tightly tied to it by commuting flows.
1
 There 
were 354 urban areas in France in 1999 with a total of 45 millions inhabitants representing 
77% of the French population. Because sorting is a more striking issue in large urban areas, 
we focus on urban areas of more than 200,000 inhabitants in 1999.  
 
                                                 
1
 In France, an urban unit (unité urbaine in French), is a set of Communes or municipalities, the territory of 
which is covered by a built-up area of more than 2,000 inhabitants, and in which buildings are separated by no 
more than 200 meters. Each urban area is built around an urban unit having at least 5 000 jobs. 
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Within each urban area, considering each municipality separately as a potential destination 
would give far too many alternatives in the location choice model.
2
 Consequently, within each 
urban area, we form groups of municipalities that will be considered as alternatives in the 
choice model. These groups are aimed at being as homogenous as possible with respect to the 
two main characteristics of our analysis: distance to the city center and household mean 
income. Therefore, in each urban area, we classify municipalities as follows: (i) first of all, 
according to their position in the urban area: city center, inner suburbs, outer suburbs; (ii) 
then, in each of these preliminary groups - -except for the city center that has only one 
municipality-, according to their position relatively to the group median distance to the city 
center: close and distant municipalities; (iii) and eventually, according to quartiles of the 
municipalities’ average household income. Therefore, we obtain 17 groups of municipalities 
that are considered as potential destinations. 
 
Note that this classification imposes to have at least eight communes in the inner suburbs and 
eight in the outer suburbs to be able to define a choice set of 17 types. Applying this criteria to 
urban areas of more than 200,000 inhabitants yields 37 urban areas (out of 41 French urban 
areas of this size).
3
 
 
We now describe the 17 types of location thus defined. For the sake of clarity, we present the 
descriptive statistics after making an additional pooling of jurisdictions: at the last step of the 
classification, we group the jurisdictions which belong to the second and third quartiles of 
average household income. Thus, we present statistics only for 13 types in Table 1. As urban 
areas can have different average household income and different spatial ranges, several 
statistics in Table 1 are given relatively to the urban area average characteristics.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the location types relatively to the urban area average 
 
  Central jurisdiction 
 income
 a
 93.2 
0 
102.3 
 distance
 b
 
 housing prices 
  Low-income 
jurisdictions 
Medium-income 
jurisdictions 
High-income 
jurisdictions 
Close 
inner  
suburbs 
Income 84.4 104.3 139.1 
Distance
 
 42.2 41.7 42.8 
housing prices 90.0 107.8 124.5 
Distant 
Inner  
suburbs 
Income 85.0 101.9 129.8 
distance
 
 97.6 94.9 84.8 
housing prices 90.3 105.6 122.6 
Close  
Outer 
Suburbs 
Income 82.0 99.4 127.4 
distance
a
 124.2 110.2 92.8 
housing prices 85.8 101.3 113.8 
Distant 
outer  
suburbs 
Income 69.1 83.0 101.3 
distance
 
 204.5 184.3 179.9 
housing prices 74.2 84.0 97.7 
These figures read as follows: on average over the 37 urban areas of our sample, the mean of households’ 
incomes in the close inner suburbs of an urban area equals 84.4% of the average value of the same statistic 
computed over all types of the same urban area. 
                                                 
2
 For instance, Lyon urban area has as many as 296 municipalities. Toulouse urban area encompasses 
342 municipalities.  
3
 The excluded urban areas are those of Brest, Reims, Limoges and Nîmes. 
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Broadly speaking, except in the close inner suburbs, high-income jurisdictions appear to be 
closer to the city center than medium-income jurisdictions, which in turn are closer than low-
income jurisdictions. Within distant inner-suburbs for instance, low-income jurisdictions are 
at 0.98 from the average distance, medium-income jurisdictions at 0.95 and high-income 
jurisdictions at 0.85. Housing prices are decreasing with distance from the city center and 
increasing with the jurisdiction’s average household income, ranging from 74% of the urban 
area mean in low-income jurisdictions of distant outer suburbs to 124% in high-income 
jurisdictions of close inner suburbs. Note that prices used in these statistics are those of 2002, 
so that we cannot use them in the estimations due to simultaneity biases.  
 
3.3. Sample definition and descriptive statistics 
 
Following Schmidheiny (2006), we focus on the behavior of households that moved within an 
urban area, ignoring immobile households and other moving households. Indeed, we suppose 
that local migrations (i.e. within an urban area) are mainly driven by motivations related to 
housing (broadly understood as including access to employment and amenities), whereas long 
distant migrations are essentially linked with the search for study and employment 
opportunities, that may be associated with different location behaviors. Furthermore, people 
newly arrived in an urban area may not know well the characteristics of locations available in 
this urban area. Defined on these criteria, the total estimation sample (summing the 37 urban 
areas) contains 210,611 households that moved between 1990 and 1999 within urban areas. 
Some comments and simple statistics are given to justify our choices and present the sample. 
 
In the 37 urban areas of our study, 51.5% of households moved between 1990 and 1999. 
Among the movers, 67.7% were living in the same urban area in 1990. Descriptive statistics 
seem to corroborate the idea that short distance moves are mainly driven by residential 
considerations whereas moves to a new urban area are employment- or study-related. Indeed, 
households that moved, but not within an urban area, have five times more often a student as 
reference person of the household (and logically display a lower mean age and mean size) 
(see Table 2). The reference person is also more often a foreign citizen, what may be partly 
due to the arrival of new immigrants looking for economic opportunities in French urban 
areas between 1990 and 1999.  
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the population and of mobile households 
 
 
Household 
with student 
as RP
1
 (%) 
Househ. with 
foreign citizen 
as RP (%) 
Mean age of 
RP 
Mean 
household size  
Household in 
a new location 
type in 1999 
(%) 
Whole 
population 
5.33 7.83 50 2.39  
Migrants within 
urban areas 
4.03 8.39 42 2.55 45.79 
Others 
migrants 
20.23 10.21 36 2.15 73.65
2
 
1
 RP: Reference Person 
2
 Calculated for households that were living in another urban area of our selection in 1990. 
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We define three “ethnic groups” and six “social groups” based on the characteristics of the 
reference person of the household.
4
 The former are foreign citizens, French citizens born 
abroad and French citizens born in France. The latter are built on the basis of occupational 
status as follows: (i) executives and high intellectual professions; (ii) mid-management 
positions; (iii) white-collar subordinates; (iv) blue-collar workers; (v) independent workers; 
(vi) economically inactive people, i.e. retirees and people who never worked. The sizes of 
these groups are given in Table 3.  
 
 
4. Empirical model of location choice and measure of residential segregation  
 
4.1. A conditional logit model of location choice 
 
We consider a random utility model, according to which utility of a household i in a location j 
is the sum of a deterministic and a random part:  
 
 ijijij VV 
*  (1) 
where Vij is the deterministic part representing the influence of observed household and 
jurisdiction characteristics and εij is the idiosyncratic random term specific to household i and 
jurisdiction j.  
 
By doing so, we suppose that households differ in terms of locational choices based on their 
income, ethnic origin and size. We also assume that they make their choice based on average 
income in the municipality and size to the center. All the choice determinants that do not 
differ with household are in the location class fixed effects j. In other words, the impact of 
the location characteristics that are constant across households are left in the location fixed 
effects, together with unobserved variables.  
 
Hence, utility is supposed to take the following form: 
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where ln(yj) is the average population income in location j, dj distance between location j and 
the city center, Oi and Ei are two vectors of dummy variables relating respectively to the 
occupational status and ethnic category of the household, Si represents its size and Fij is a 
dummy variable indicating whether location i was the former location of the household. j, 1 
to 3 ,  11 to 32 and  are vectors of coefficients to be estimated.  
 
A household chooses among potential locations by comparing its utility level in the different 
location types and select location j which maximizes his utility:  
 ),...,1(
** KCkVV ikij   (3) 
where C is the choice set of K alternative locations.  
                                                 
4
 The reference person of the household is always the man in households where a man and a woman are in 
couple and either a man or a woman in all other cases. 
Goffette-Nagot, F. ; Schaeffer, Y. Income segregation and suburbanization in France: a discrete choice approach.
Thematic Meeting of the French Economic Association "Economic geography and public policies", Saint Etienne, May 10-11 2012.
 11 
 
We assume that the error terms are identically and independently distributed following an 
extreme value distribution, of which cumulative distribution function is given by: 
 
 
 (4) 
 
As a result, the probability for a household i to choose location j is:  
  (5) 
This conditional logit model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
 
Our empirical model then focuses on interaction variables between the location characteristics 
and household's characteristics. As stated in the theoretical model, we expect that households 
sort themselves by income relatively to the distance to the central city. We introduce 
interactions between dummies for household's social categories (white-collars in mid 
management positions being the reference) and location distance to the city center (and this 
variable squared). The same is done with a dummy for household's ethnicity (French born in 
France being the reference). We also control for household's size by introducing interactions 
with distance and its square. The same interaction variables are built with the location mean 
income instead of distance to the central city in order to account for preferences for location 
income. 
 
To sum up, household variables interacted with location characteristics are the following:  
- dummies for the reference person occupational status, 
- dummy for the reference person not being a French citizen, 
- dummy for the reference person being a French citizen born abroad, 
- number of persons living in the household. 
 
Location variables are: 
- mean fiscal income in 1990
5
 divided by its average over the 17 types, 
- distance to the central city in km
6
 less the mean distance to the city center over the 17 types 
in the urban area, so as to avoid colinearity with their squared counterparts. 
- (distance less mean distance) squared. 
 
A variable is both a household and location variable: 
- dummy for the type being the former location type of the household. 
 
4.2. Choice probabilities and measures of social and ethnic segregation 
 
Our aim is not only to test for the different conjectured factors of location choices, but also to 
assess the importance of each of them in segregation levels observed in French urban areas. 
We can do so by comparing segregation levels in different counterfactual cities that are 
predicted by the model estimated coefficients.  
 
                                                 
5
 For each type, we sum the total fiscal income of communities belonging to the type and divide by the total 
number of households of these communities. 
6
 For each type, this distance is the average over all communities belonging to the type of the community level 
distances to the city center, weighted by the number of housing in these municipalities. 
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Segregation levels are classically measured by different spatial concentration indexes. Among 
them, the dissimilarity index is the most commonly used. Based on socio-occupational 
categories and ethnic origins that we use in the location model, we compute multi-group 
dissimilarity indexes (Readon and Firebaugh, 2002) of which the general expression is the 
following: 
 
  
 

M
m
J
j
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I
D
1 1
1
2
1
  (6) 
 
where m indexes the different groups of population and j the different locations. m is the 
proportion of group m in the population, wj is the weight of location j in the total population 
and jm is the share in group m for the population in location j. I is equal to )1(
1
m
M
m
m 

  and 
measures the diversity of groups among the population of the urban area. 
 
Dissimilarity indexes will be computed to assess different kinds of segregation: multi-group 
segregation including all social groups or including only working social groups, binary 
indexes opposing pairs of social groups, and similarly for ethnic segregation. 
 
Estimation of the conditional logit model in a given urban area provides for each household 
its probabilities to choose each available location alternatives. Of course we also know the 
true distribution of moving households among locations. Hence, we can compute measures of 
segregation in both cases and compare observed and predicted patterns, so as to assess how 
well our estimated model accounts for the observed residential segregation.  
 
Then, using only the coefficients attached to one dimension of location choice (e.g. distance 
to the central city) and setting all other coefficients except fixed effects to zero, a new set of 
choice probabilities can be predicted. Measuring segregation with the resulting counterfactual 
household distribution provides information as to the contribution of this causal channel to the 
production of segregation.  
 
More specifically, we will compute three types of predicted location choice probability.  
The general form of this probability is:  
  (7) 
where Vij takes different forms as follows: 
 
 (i) Probabilities predicted by the full model  
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This is simply the prediction of the full model and allows us to assess the explanatory power 
of the location model in terms of segregation level. 
 
(ii) Probabilities predicted by a given segregation channel 
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Our conditional logit model includes only three locational characteristics: local average 
income, distance to the central city and, for each household, if it is its former location. The 
first two location characteristics are interacted with household characteristics, allowing 
location behaviors to differ along the line of the latter. The third is per se both a location and a 
household characteristic. Taking our estimation results and setting all the coefficients 
corresponding to these variables to zero, except those associated with one of these segregation 
channels provides us the choice probabilities that would be relevant if only this channel 
produced social and ethnic segregation or in other words if households considered only this 
determinant in their location choice. Computing the corresponding dissimilarity indexes, we 
can assess the relative contribution to segregation of each of these channels. 
 
For instance, the predicted probability based on the distance segregation channel would be: 
 
 ijijijijijijjij SdSdEdEdOdOdV
2
3231
2
2221
2
1211
~
   (9) 
 
We refer in particular to the inertia model, which gives the following predicted probabilities: 
 
 ijjij FV  
~
 (10) 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Estimation results. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the five largest urban areas, namely Paris, Lyon, Marseille, 
Lille and Toulouse, are presented in Table 4 as examples. Joint significativity tests aimed at 
assessing the significance of each of the interactions in the model are presented for the 37 
urban areas in table 5. The signs of estimated significant coefficients are presented in Table 6. 
First of all, fixed effects are always jointly significant (Table 5). Estimated fixed effects for 
the 17 location classes are all negative: the central city (chosen as the reference category) 
receives always more migrants, what obviously reflects differences in housing stocks, which 
are also differences in housing opportunities. More densely populated locations mechanically 
receive more migrants. As expected, it is also observed that outer suburbs – which exhibit a 
very low density compared to others – generally display the lowest coefficients. These fixed 
effects thus control, among other effects, for the size differences between locations. 
 
We comment only briefly the coefficients corresponding to the effect of household size and 
previous location. Household size significantly influence distance choice in the vast majority 
of the urban areas. The effect is the one predicted by urban economic models: large 
households locate further away from the city center, although the effect is not linear, as shown 
by the coefficient of quadratic distance. The interaction between household size and average 
location income is significant and positive in 13 urban areas, which can be interpreted in 
particular as the fact that the presence of children increases the preference for wealthy 
locations. Finally, there is a very significant effect of previous location on location choices: 
the location type where the household was initially is very more likely to be chosen as the 
new destination when moving. 
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The interactions of social category dummies with location average income are jointly 
significant in 29 out of 37 urban areas. This result points out the power of the search for 
income-related amenities in residential location choices. When significant, the coefficient of 
the "executive" category is positive, whereas it is always negative for white-collar 
subordinates and blue-collars (Table 6). This is true in particular for the five urban areas in 
Table 4. As expected, the most affluent social groups are more attracted by the most affluent 
locations than the less favored social groups. However, in most urban areas, the coefficient of 
the interaction with location income is higher for blue-collar than for white-collar 
subordinates: although the income differential between these two categories is very small, 
they behave somewhat differently regarding income-related amenities.  
 
The effect of social status on the choice of distance is slightly less often significant. 
Nevertheless, these interactions are jointly significant in 27 out of 37 urban areas (Table 5). 
On average, white-collar subordinates have the most negative coefficients: they are the least 
attracted by distant locations, compared to intermediate categories (Table 6). Apart from 
Paris, it is the case in the five largest urban areas considered in Table 4. In Paris urban area, 
the executives are the category that is the most reluctant to settle in distant locations, ceteris 
paribus. This can be explained by the level of traffic congestion, that makes wealthy 
households locate close to the center. Blue-collar workers behave differently from white-
collar subordinates: they behave either like the intermediate category (reference) or are more 
attracted by distant locations (in only three urban areas, among which Paris). This result is in 
line with what we already know from urban configurations in France: it has been observed 
that blue-collar workers are more prone to locate in outer suburbs than white-collars 
(Goffette-Nagot, 2000). What we show here is that it remains true after controlling for 
preferences regarding income-related amenities.  
 
The effect of ethnic origin, after controlling for social status, is slightly weaker than that of 
occupational status. Still, the coefficients of the interactions between ethnic origin and 
distance from the central city are significant and negative in the majority of the urban areas 
(21 urban areas). This centralization of foreigners could be the consequence of a strong 
concentration of public housing in the inner suburbs and the fact that foreign households are 
often housed in public housing. Further, only in half of the urban areas (18) do foreign 
citizens behave differently than French citizen born in France regarding location income, by 
locating in less affluent municipalities. French citizens born abroad behave more often as their 
fellow-citizens, except in the four biggest urban areas (Paris, Lyon, Marseille and Lille) and 
in three others of medium size. This result can also be the consequence of public housing 
accommodation, as the average income in the municipality is likely to be correlated with the 
percentage of public housing in the housing stock. The significantly different behavior of 
foreign households can also be the consequence of network effects, as immigrants often 
choose to settle near individuals belonging to the same ethnic group.  
 
5.2. Analysis of social and ethnic segregation. 
 
In the three following sections, we present and analyze simple statistics for the dissimilarity 
indexes computed for each of the 37 urban areas. In the first section, we look at how well our 
full model can predict the observed socially and ethnically segregated patterns. Based on 
predictions obtained with partial models, we then try to assess the relative contributions to 
segregation of the choices of “neighborhood income” and “distance to the central city”. 
Lastly, we try to disentangle the social and ethnic determinants of the observed segregated 
pattern. 
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5.2.1. Observed segregation patterns and predictions of the full model 
 
Table 7 and 8 present the observed and predicted dissimilarity indexes for the five largest 
urban areas taken as examples, for income and ethnic segregation respectively. The following 
tables display indexes averaged over the 37 urban areas: observed indexes in Table 9 and the 
ratio of predicted to observed indexes in Table 10. 
 
Broadly speaking, we can first note that the mean values of the dissimilarity indexes 
computed here at a supra-municipality geographic level are low compared to what is generally 
obtained in studies working with municipality or infra-municipality levels. This is expected as 
social and ethnic segregation is likely to be stronger the finer the spatial scale considered. 
Note also that individuals considered in the sample are migrants and it is not clear a priori 
whether their spatial segregation is likely to be stronger or weaker than the segregation level 
of the whole population.  
 
The household charateristics considered in the estimated model allow to consider separately 
households of which the reference person is out of labor force and those of which the 
reference person is in labor force. Among the latter, five categories are considered: 
executives, intermediate professions, white-collars, blue-collars and independent workers. We 
first discuss segregation between these five categories and then oppose them to the category 
of inactive individuals. We base our discussion on indexes averaged over the 37 urban areas. 
 
The mean value of the multi-group dissimilarity index corresponding to the observed spatial 
distribution of categories in labor force is equal to 0.14, considering either four or five social 
groups (Table 9).
7
 Regarding binary oppositions between the four income-ordered social 
categories, we observe that the highest index is obtained for the opposition between 
executives and blue-collars (0.25) and the second highest for the one between executives and 
white-collar subordinates (0.19). A lower value is obtained for the opposition between 
executives and white-collars in mid-management positions (0.15). A value of 0.14 is then 
obtained for all other oppositions implying the latter. Thereby, social segregation seems to 
obey to income hierarchy between social groups: the higher the income differential, the 
higher the value of the dissimilarity index. However, less expected in this respect is the strong 
segregation between white-collar subordinates and blue-collars (0.18), two categories that 
display a nearly equal mean income level. Finally, the mean dissimilarity index increases to 
0.16 when the category of economically inactive households is added to the five-group index. 
This result may be surprising given the low value of the dissimilarity index corresponding to 
the binary opposition between economically active and inactive households (0.13).  
 
Regarding now ethnic segregation, the mean value of the multi-group dissimilarity index 
opposing foreign citizen, French citizen born abroad and French citizen born in France is 
0.18. As expected, the highest value of binary indexes opposing these groups is obtained for 
the opposition between foreign citizen and French citizen born in France (0.24). More 
interesting is the higher value of the index corresponding to the opposition between French 
born abroad and foreign citizen (0.19) than that between French born abroad and French born 
in France (0.15). “Spatial integration” among French citizens is far from perfect but seems to 
be at work. 
                                                 
7
 The four group index considers only the four categories that can be meaningfully ordered by mean income by 
consumption unit, i.e. executives, white-collars in mid-management positions, white-collar subordinates and 
blue-collars (see section 3.3). Independent workers are added to build the five group index. 
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Yet, the question we are interested in is the following: to what extent is our parsimonious 
location choice model able to predict this observed segregation pattern? Recall that our model 
includes only three location characteristics: location mean income, location distance to the 
central city and, for each household, if it is its former location. Thereby, this model features 
only three “segregation channels”: differing choices of “income” and “distance” between 
households of differing characteristics, as well as the inertia of the previously prevailing 
segregated pattern due to the advantages associated with relocating nearby one’s former 
location (better information about housing supply, lower moving costs, access to previously 
built social networks, etc.). Knowing the predictive power of our full model provides 
information on the importance of these factors in the formation of social and ethnic 
segregation. To support this point, dissimilarity indexes are now computed considering the 
distribution of households corresponding to the choice probabilities predicted by our 
conditional logit estimation results (see equation 8 section 4.2). For each of these indexes, we 
comment the average value of the predicted index relatively to the observed index.  
 
The model predicts, on average over the 37 urban areas, 72% of the value of the observed 
multi-group dissimilarity indexes built with economically active households (either with four 
or five groups) and 80% of the value of the multi-group index built with both active and 
inactive households (Table 9). It predicts on average 71% of the value of the observed binary 
index opposing active to inactive households, and from 65% to 76% of the values of the ones 
opposing occupational categories. Regarding ethnic segregation, the model predicts on 
average 64% of the value of the observed ethnic multi-group dissimilarity index. It predicts 
68% of the value of the observed binary index opposing foreign citizen to French citizen born 
in France, 73% of the one opposing foreign citizen to French citizen born abroad and 54% of 
the one opposing French citizen born in France to French citizen born abroad.  
 
This set of results shows that the estimated model reproduces quite well the observed 
segregation patterns. Even in the urban areas where it is the less explanatory, it still predicts 
more than 30% of the observed social segregation level. This indicates clearly that the three 
segregation channels included in our model indeed contribute strongly to the formation of 
social and ethnic segregation.  
 
5.2.2. “Income driven” vs. “Distance driven” ethnic and social segregation. 
 
As explained in details in section 4.2, it is possible, by computing predicted location choices 
considering only one characteristics of location (income, distance or being the former 
household's location), to assess how strong the segregation would be if households considered 
only this characteristic when choosing their location. By doing so, we can determine whether 
the observed social segregation is mainly explained by the Alonso model or by income-
related amenities.  
 
Table 11 shows that the proportion of the value of the observed five-group dissimilarity index 
explained by the “income” channel partial model is 40% vs. 37% for the “distance” channel 
partial model and 32% for the “inertia” channel partial model.8 Segregation among the 
economically active social groups thus appears to be mainly driven by choices of location 
average income, but choices of distance to the central city and the location inertia also 
contribute significantly.  
                                                 
8
 The same proportions are respectively 42%, 36% and 32% for the four-group index. 
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Adding the economically inactive population in the analysis reverses this conclusion: 
segregation between social groups is now mainly (but only slightly) driven by distance, the 
“income” model explaining 56% vs. 58% for the “distance” model and 52% for the “inertia” 
model. Looking at binary oppositions allows to refine the analysis. Segregation between 
economically active and inactive households is clearly driven by the “distance” channel: the 
“income” model explains only 29% vs. 57% for the “distance” model and 25% for the 
“inertia” model. As predicted by the standard urban economic model, estimation results for 
most of the urban areas show that inactive households settle significantly further away from 
the central city.  
 
Regarding economically active households, on the one hand, all the oppositions implying 
executives show a much stronger contribution to segregation of the “income” channel 
compared to the “distance” channel. The proportion of the value of the observed index 
opposing executives to blue-collars explained by the “income” model is 51% vs. only 16% for 
the “distance” model (and 32% for the “inertia” model). The same proportions are 
respectively 45% vs. 21% (and 46%) for the opposition between executives and white-collars 
in mid-management positions and 59% vs. 50% (and 38%) for the opposition between 
executives and white-collar subordinates. Executives presumably settle in affluent 
neighborhoods hardly accessible for others groups. Amenity considerations seem more 
important than the standard urban economic trade-off between proximity to the central 
business district and land consumption to explain the segregation between this group and 
poorer households.  
 
The same prevails for the opposition between white-collars in mid management positions and 
blue-collars (proportions are respectively 42%, 19% and 35%). On the other hand, the 
“distance” channel is clearly dominant in the explanation of the segregation between white-
collars in mid management positions and white-collar subordinates (35% for the “income” 
model vs. 54% for the “distance” model and 24% for the “inertia” model), and it is even more 
the case regarding the segregation between the latter and blue-collars (23% vs. 55% and 
27%). The specific behavior of white-collar subordinates with respect to the choice of 
distance to the central city is at the source of the surprisingly strong segregation level 
observed between this group and blue-collars and the surprisingly low segregation level 
observed between this group and executives already stressed in section 5.2.1. Estimation 
results show that in most of the urban areas, white-collar subordinates – although displaying 
a similar income compared to blue-collars – do not follow them in their migration toward 
peripheral urban locations. They tend to settle in central locations, so that they do not 
segregate too much from the more economically favored groups (white-collars in mid 
management positions and executives), although they choose more central locations than the 
former and less affluent locations than the latter. This point would be worth further 
investigations. 
 
Regarding ethnic segregation, the proportion of the value of the observed multi-group 
dissimilarity index explained by the “income” model is 24% vs. 35% for the “distance” model 
and 43% for the “inertia” model (Table 12). Ethnic groups were segregated in 1990 and as 
moving households preferentially chose to relocate close to their initial location, they are still 
segregated in 1999: this segregation inertia appears to be the first segregation force. One 
reason may be that foreign citizens are less able to get information about housing supply in 
other parts of the urban area and less able to support large moving costs. Another reason may 
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be that they are more dependent on local social networks, for instance due to their larger 
participation to informal economic activities.  
 
Differing choices of distance to the central city between ethnic groups is the second 
segregation force. This could be explained by the over-representation of foreign citizen and 
French citizen born abroad in public housing and the historical clustering of public housing in 
close inner suburbs. Binary oppositions provide additional insights. Segregation between 
foreign citizens and French citizens born in France is also mainly driven by the “distance” 
channel, but the “income” channel appears more important than in the multi-group case: the 
“income” model explains 32% vs. 39% for the “distance” model and 41% for the “inertia” 
model. Regarding segregation between foreign citizens and French citizens born abroad, the 
“distance” channel is more important than both the “income” and the “inertia” channels (52% 
vs. 37% and 39%). This may be explained by the exit of public housing and consecutive 
decentralization of a large number of French citizens born abroad being former foreign 
citizens having simultaneously acquired the French nationality and improved their economic 
conditions of living. Eventually, regarding segregation between French citizens born abroad 
and French citizens born in France, the “income” channel (11%) is still dominated by the 
“distance” channel (29%), but most of all, the “inertia” channel (44%) strongly dominates 
both other channels (11% vs. 29% and 44%). Again, we can think that a large number of 
French citizens born abroad are former foreign citizens having acquired the nationality and 
improved their conditions of living: they were thus likely to be strongly segregated from 
French citizen born in France in 1990. Now, although their behaviors regarding location 
characteristics came closer to the behaviors of French citizens born in France, the former level 
of segregation is partly reproduced due to the advantages procured by the relocation nearby 
one’s former location. However, the thrust of this last comment is limited by the relatively 
poor performance of our model in explaining this binary index (only 54% of the observed 
index is explained by the full model, which is the lowest explanation power displayed in our 
study).  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides a framework aimed at analyzing the determinants of location choices and 
social and ethnic segregation within urban areas. Our objective is to assess empirically the 
relative contribution of income-based sorting and Alonso-sorting mechanisms to social and 
ethnic segregation in 37 large French urban areas. We propose a conditional logit model of 
urban location choic in which moving households are assumed to sort based on jurisdiction 
distance to the central city and jurisdiction average household income (as a proxy for the level 
of public amenities). Estimation of this model provides for each household its probabilities to 
choose each one the available location alternatives and allow the comparison of various 
predicted segregation patterns with the observed segregation pattern.  
 
Our main results are the following. Going beyond the standard urban model to take into 
account income-related amenities is strongly justified by our results: segregation among 
economically active social groups appears to be mainly driven by the income channel, 
especially for the most affluent social group. Nevertheless, segregation between economically 
active and inactive households is mainly explained by distance, as predicted by the standard 
urban economic model. Regarding ethnic segregation, the distance channel dominates the 
income one, but this is likely to be due to a non-market effect, i.e. the location of the public 
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housing supply in close inner-suburbs. More important, both of them are dominated by the 
inertia of the previously prevailing segregated pattern.  
 
Our analysis thus confirms the importance of the choices of distance to the central city and 
neighborhood income in the formation of residential segregation. It also shed light on a third 
segregation channel that may be worth further investigation: the tendency to relocate nearby 
one’s former location, which is presumably linked with the question of moving costs and 
access to social networks. 
 
Several limits should now be overrun. First, our analyses are mainly based on mean 
tendencies among the 37 urban areas considered. We should try to explain the heterogeneity 
displayed in our results. Second, our econometric model assumes the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives hypothesis (IAA). We should test for it and if necessary turn to another 
model.  
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients of the conditional logit model for the five largest urban areas.  
 
 Paris Lyon Aix-Marseille Lille Toulouse 
 coeff. std coeff. std coeff. std coeff. std coeff. std 
Interactions with location av. income           
av. income x executive 1.25*** 0.05 1.37*** 0.19 1.81*** 0.39 1.3*** 0.21 1.34*** 0.38 
av. income x white-collar -0.88*** 0.05 -0.54*** 0.18 -0.82** 0.37 -0.89*** 0.21 -1.05** 0.43 
av. income x blue collar -1.36*** 0.06 -0.85*** 0.16 -1.87*** 0.35 -1.8*** 0.19 -1.24*** 0.39 
av. income x indep. work. 0.66*** 0.08 0.75*** 0.24 0.37 0.47 0.67** 0.30 0.27 0.49 
av. income x out of lab. force -0.2*** 0.06 -0.27 0.18 -0.01 0.35 -0.73*** 0.21 -0.81* 0.43 
av. income x F. born abroad -0.61*** 0.06 -0.63*** 0.20 -0.68** 0.32 -0.81** 0.34 0.3 0.38 
av. income x foreigner -1.21*** 0.06 -1.82*** 0.22 -1.73*** 0.59 -2.22*** 0.36 -1.02 0.80 
av. income x hsld size -0.06*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.2*** 0.05 0.37*** 0.10 
Interactions with location av. distance           
distance x executive -1.01*** 0.11 -0.87 0.58 1.25* 0.70 -0.52 1.05 -0.48 0.89 
dist.**2 x executive 2.48*** 0.41 7.93* 4.30 7.43** 3.37 17.75 11.88 9.06 6.37 
distance x white-collar -0.76*** 0.11 -1.46*** 0.54 -1.59** 0.66 -1.26 1.01 -1.71** 0.81 
dist.**2 x white-collar -0.3 0.43 5.97 4.02 -3.16 3.03 6.41 11.11 -0.53 5.96 
distance x blue collar 0.86*** 0.10 0.99** 0.43 -0.05 0.58 -1.92** 0.93 0.17 0.71 
dist.**2 x blue collar 0.29 0.41 -4.71 3.51 -5.49** 2.73 -34.53*** 10.35 -4.39 5.25 
distance x indep. work. 0.62*** 0.14 1.1 0.68 0.81 0.81 2.73* 1.42 2.54*** 0.93 
dist.**2 x indep. work. 4.06*** 0.58 -0.01 5.24 1.53 3.87 2.88 16.05 5.5 6.91 
distance x out of lab. force 0.48*** 0.11 -0.69 0.53 0.22 0.59 0.76 1.02 0.68 0.77 
dist.**2 x out of lab. force 4.05*** 0.43 -0.96 4.01 1.85 2.83 10.93 10.99 8.95 5.91 
distance x F. born abroad -2.52*** 0.14 -1.76*** 0.57 -0.21 0.52 -3.22 2.61 -0.77 0.75 
dist.**2 x F. born abroad -1.5*** 0.50 -2.31 4.29 -0.63 2.43 -8.89 25.72 -2 5.57 
distance x foreigner -3.59*** 0.14 -4.62*** 0.65 -1.78* 1.01 -5.84** 2.89 -5.77*** 1.55 
dist.**2 x foreigner -0.95* 0.51 0.17 4.77 3.42 5.14 -5.43 27.79 1.68 11.20 
distance x hsld size 0.58*** 0.02 0.91*** 0.11 0.07 0.14 1.85*** 0.23 1.41*** 0.18 
distance**2 x hsld size -2.69*** 0.09 -11.4*** 0.90 -2.91*** 0.68 -7.1*** 2.51 -9.74*** 1.36 
           
Previous residence in same location 2.15*** 0.01 2.11*** 0.02 2.86*** 0.02 2.32*** 0.02 2.11*** 0.03 
Averaged fixed effects 
(all fixed effects are signif. at 1% level) 
          
Close inner suburbs -0.8  -1.73  -1.91  -0.84  -2.15  
Distant inner suburbs -2.03  -3.03  -1.93  -1.42  -3.01  
Close outer suburbs -2.64  -3.23  -2.58  -2.64  -3.21  
Distant outer suburbs -3.19  -3.1  -2.72  -3.08  -3.49  
           
Log likelihood -163,352  -20,636  -12,608  -13,335  -10,731  
Number of observations 89,823  11,895  10,799  7,846  6,242  
***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 5: Joint significativity tests of estimated coefficients of the conditional logit – 37 urban areas.  
 
 Paris Lyon Aix-
Marseille 
Lille Toulouse Nice Bordeaux Nantes Strasbourg Toulon Douai-
Lens 
Rennes Rouen 
Likelihood -16,352 -20,636 -12,608 -13,335 -10,731 -9,161 -11,074 -7,905 -6,264 -5,622 -4,650 -5,478 -7,348 
Interactions w/ occupation 4282.3*** 293.8*** 142.0*** 268.8*** 146.5*** 72.3*** 216.6*** 117.8*** 93.6*** 30.85** 45.06*** 131.56*** 168.8*** 
av. income x occ. 2695*** 167.52*** 103.5*** 239.7*** 529*** 38.08*** 89.57*** 18.64*** 23.94*** 3.48 39.86*** 6.31 106.6*** 
distance x occ. 890.6*** 103.9*** 50.9*** 39.5*** 56.4*** 22.57** 81.35*** 68.46*** 58.03*** 12.67 11.49 80.07*** 64.43*** 
Interactions w/ origin 1856.3*** 146.7*** 54.6*** 73.0*** 51.0*** 22.93*** 40.05*** 29.6*** 133.09*** 14.14** 5.43 49.16*** 48.99*** 
av. income x origin 483.6*** 68.29*** 13.31*** 45.0*** -0.56 1.1 4.36 -0.3 -0.19 -0.57 2.76 -1.62 10.99*** 
distance x origin 1640.9*** 104.35*** 26.95*** 29.8*** 47.3*** 21.03*** 37.41*** 29.46*** 126.03*** 8.66 2.79 45.3*** 35.31*** 
Fixed effects 92511*** 10304*** 13052*** 8688*** 4580*** 8263 4357*** 3642*** 3318*** 5073*** 4064*** 2335*** 3342*** 
Whole model 182271*** 26131*** 35975*** 17789*** 13909*** 21059*** 12123*** 10489*** 9436*** 10248*** 7886*** 7578*** 6452*** 
 
 
 Grenoble Mont-
pellier 
Metz Nancy Clermont-
Ferrand 
Valencien
nes 
Tours Caen Orléans Angers  Dijon Saint-
Étienne 
Le Havre 
Likelihood -6,090 -3990 -4721 -4813 -5023 -3914 -4044 -4530 -3845 -3343 -3440 -2542 -2309 
Interactions w/ occupation 139.42*** 102.69*** 92.03*** 90.83*** 87.11*** 63.85*** 65.3*** 82.79*** 99.19*** 39.23*** 86.63*** 23.44* 90.65*** 
av. income x occ. 108.94*** 41.56*** 52.4*** 49.6*** 37.1*** 41.8*** 18.8*** 40.5*** 48.6*** 20.9*** 47.1*** 8.5 53.2*** 
distance x occ. 40.95*** 47.85*** 19.01** 32.88*** 54.85*** 1.63 38.81*** 40.65*** 52.31*** 14.82 43.62*** 12.81 15.61 
Interactions w/ origin 28.85*** 61.44*** 44.74*** 47.2*** 27.06*** -0.13 12.43* 8.53** 16.49** 27.45*** 32.05*** 26.54*** 15.54** 
av. income x origin 5.73 3.18 40.99*** 25.88*** 2.1 -3.89 -3.5 2.32 -1.83 5.23* 11.37*** 9.36** -3.73 
distance x origin 19.45*** 46.3*** 20.79*** 38.41*** 24.07*** -0.41 10.78** 2.74* 15.6*** 21.73*** 19.79*** 15.79*** 15.08*** 
Fixed effects 3008*** 1812*** 2760*** 2049*** 2074*** 2823*** 1516*** 1584*** 1388*** 1194*** 1190*** 2196*** 945*** 
Whole model 7408*** 7586*** 5461*** 5185*** 5458***  4735*** 4792*** 4534*** 3982***  4918*** 5184*** 7927*** 7894*** 
 
 
 Le Mans Avignon Mulhouse Amiens Béthune Dunkerque Perpignan Besançon Pau Bayonne Genève(CH)-
Annemasse 
Likelihood -2799 -2687 -2770 -2295 -2140 -3027 -2377 -1901 -2086 -2245 -2462 
Interactions w/ occupation 57.24*** 36.72*** 43.47*** 57.24*** 28.65** 52.8*** 19.28 58.74*** 28.47** 20.5 29.9** 
av. income x occ. 14.62** 18.09*** 18.06*** 8.98 23.09*** 38.61*** 0.24 12.3** 0.61 7.15 6.54 
distance x occ. 26.32*** 18.34** 20.44** 23.24** 5.96 10.35 15.65 35.01** 22.58** 9.69 21.66** 
Interactions w/ origin 18.29** 20.3*** 23.31*** 10.38 0.67 8.07 14.25** 25.77** 7.44 9.07 4.08 
av. income x origin 2.45 14.09*** 7.75** -3.2 -3.03 -4.16 -0.41 -0.35 0.07 1.42 0.53 
distance x origin 15.17*** 5.15 7.62 9.86** -2.45 7.21 12.54** 25.49*** 5.93 0.71 3.33 
Fixed effects 1127*** 2335*** 1115*** 769*** 1690*** 1971*** 1674*** 614*** 561*** 1211*** 1727*** 
Whole model 5180 4388*** 4586***  4340*** 3840*** 3585*** 4289*** 4006*** 2645*** 2820*** 2210*** 
 
***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 6: Signs of significant  coefficients – 37 urban areas 
 
 
 Paris Lyon 
Aix-
Mar-
seille 
Lille 
Tou-
louse 
Nice 
Bor-
deaux 
Nantes 
Stras-
bourg 
Toulon 
Douai-
Lens 
Ren-
nes 
Rouen 
Greno-
ble 
Mont-
pellier 
Metz Nancy 
Cler-
mont-
Ferrand 
Valen-
ciennes 
inc x ex + + + + + +   +    + + + + + + + 
inc x bl - - - - -  - - -  - - - -  - - - - 
inc x wh - - - - - - - -   - - -   - -  - 
inc x ind + +  +  + -        +     
inc x ina - -  - -  -    -     -   - 
inc ffor - - - -             -   
inc x for - - - -   -     - - - - - - -  
inc x siz - +  + + +  + + -  + + + + + +   
dis x ex -  +     -            
dis2 x ex + + +          + +      
dis x bl + +  -   +             
dis2 x bl   - -          -    -  
dis x wh - - -  -  - - -   - - -   - -  
dis2 x wh                    
dis x ind +   + + + + +    + +  + + + +  
dis2 x ind +     +              
dis x ina +        -   +        
dis2 x ina +       + +  +         
dis ffor - -    - - - -    - -   -   
dis2 x ffor -     -              
dis x for - - - - -  - - -   - - - - - - -  
dis2 x for -     +              
dis x siz + +  + +  + + +   + + + + + + +  
dis2 x siz - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
prev res. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
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Table 6: Signs of significant  coefficients – 37 urban areas (continued) 
 
 Tours Caen 
Or-
léans 
An-
gers 
 
Dijon 
Saint-
Étien-
ne 
Le 
Havre 
Le 
Mans 
Avi-
gnon 
Mul-
house 
A-
miens 
Béthu
ne 
Dunker-
que 
Perpi-
gnan 
Besan-
çon 
Pau 
Bayon
-ne 
Genève-
Anne-
masse 
Total + Total  - 
inc x ex + + +  +    +   +      + 21  
inc x bl - - - - - - - -   -  -  -     27 
inc x wh  - -  -  -   - -  -  -     22 
inc x ind        - +          6 2 
inc x ina -    -  -     - -  -     14 
inc ffor        - -           7 
inc x for  -  - - -   - -          18 
inc x siz  +                 13 2 
dis x ex  -                 1 3 
dis2 x ex   +  +              7  
dis x bl                   3 1 
dis2 x bl                  + 1 4 
dis x wh  - -  -  - -  - -    -     20 
dis2 x wh                +   1  
dis x ind + + +  +        -  +   + 18 1 
dis2 x ind          +         3  
dis x ina  -        -         2 3 
dis2 x ina  +       +         + 7  
dis ffor  -  - -      -         13 
dis2 x ffor                    2 
dis x for   - - -   -  -     -     21 
dis2 x for                   1 1 
dis x siz + + + + +  + +  + +  +  +    25  
dis2 x siz - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - -  35 
prev res. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +  37 
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Table 7: Income segregation indexes of the five largest urban areas 
 
 Paris Lyon Marseille Lille Toulouse 
Four groups      
Observed 0.18630 0.15553 0.09821 0.17279 0.10778 
Whole model 0.17881 0.13167 0.10218 0.14914 0.08644 
Distance only 0.06219 0.05096 0.07443 0.03592 0.05497 
Income only 0.12292 0.06211 0.08159 0.11830 0.07325 
Previous location only 0.07201 0.05820 0.04165 0.06860 0.02701 
Five groups      
Observed 0.17710 0.15139 0.09398 0.17009 0.11091 
Whole model 0.17037 0.12527 0.09241 0.14871 0.09324 
Distance only 0.05900 0.04692 0.06682 0.03833 0.05626 
Income only 0.11619 0.06122 0.07373 0.11701 0.06615 
Previous location only 0.06917 0.05389 0.03811 0.06742 0.02907 
In/out labor force      
Observed 0.07774 0.09185 0.08969 0.11147 0.14391 
Whole model 0.06795 0.06839 0.06110 0.07603 0.10411 
Distance only 0.07007 0.07075 0.02411 0.06723 0.08083 
Income only 0.01251 0.01783 0.01574 0.03995 0.05487 
Previous location only 0.02417 0.01723 0.04789 0.03922 0.02023 
Executives/blue-collars      
Observed 0.42443 0.33294 0.16615 0.36385 0.20225 
Whole model 0.41523 0.29237 0.16213 0.31904 0.13947 
Distance only 0.12259 0.03914 0.11887 0.04776 0.01776 
Income only 0.27565 0.15010 0.22771 0.28244 0.16632 
Previous location only 0.16370 0.15299 0.07087 0.15337 0.07380 
Executives/intermediate category      
Observed 0.23412 0.16674 0.09519 0.15833 0.10911 
Whole model 0.22340 0.15274 0.09324 0.12183 0.08536 
Distance only 0.07078 0.01664 0.04918 0.02116 0.02867 
Income only 0.11697 0.09960 0.12012 0.12902 0.10267 
Previous location only 0.10884 0.08466 0.03944 0.06338 0.03551 
Executives/white-collars      
Observed 0.29837 0.18975 0.15868 0.23487 0.13885 
Whole model 0.28396 0.17606 0.17019 0.23017 0.15475 
Distance only 0.01632 0.09703 0.10607 0.03949 0.13310 
Income only 0.20839 0.13725 0.16935 0.21222 0.16984 
Previous location only 0.12416 0.10002 0.06575 0.10208 0.04252 
Intermediate category/blue-collars      
Observed 0.20267 0.17502 0.10495 0.22826 0.11524 
Whole model 0.19793 0.14805 0.10243 0.20746 0.08562 
Distance only 0.05182 0.04387 0.06969 0.05231 0.01302 
Income only 0.15989 0.06402 0.10830 0.15450 0.06425 
Previous location only 0.06185 0.07166 0.03879 0.09590 0.03866 
Intermediate category/white-collars      
Observed 0.10477 0.12263 0.08894 0.13906 0.10348 
Whole model 0.09431 0.09954 0.09747 0.10961 0.09286 
Distance only 0.06667 0.09051 0.09256 0.01833 0.10444 
Income only 0.09157 0.04537 0.04928 0.08423 0.06777 
Previous location only 0.02615 0.02437 0.04167 0.04341 0.00838 
White-collars/blue-collars      
Observed 0.14617 0.18004 0.13582 0.15549 0.17186 
Whole model 0.14694 0.14603 0.13326 0.13000 0.13040 
Distance only 0.11849 0.13439 0.15092 0.05981 0.11535 
Income only 0.06895 0.01865 0.05902 0.07052 0.00352 
Previous location only 0.04087 0.05303 0.05351 0.06680 0.03264 
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Table 8: Ethnic segregation indexes of the five largest urban areas 
 
 Paris Lyon Marseille Lille Toulouse 
Multigroup ethnic segregation      
Observed 0.14330 0.14217 0.09389 0.22632 0.08820 
Whole model 0.14036 0.12330 0.08008 0.18648 0.06527 
Distance only 0.09096 0.06378 0.02013 0.04057 0.04602 
Income only 0.11391 0.07457 0.05522 0.12344 0.00331 
Previous location only 0.06518 0.06544 0.06145 0.10850 0.06183 
Foreign citizen/French citizen      
Observed 0.17102 0.18351 0.17504 0.30040 0.22004 
Whole model 0.16759 0.17023 0.14130 0.25067 0.19473 
Distance only 0.09567 0.09149 0.05894 0.07068 0.15070 
Income only 0.16486 0.12213 0.10550 0.18528 0.01096 
Previous location only 0.07452 0.07462 0.07982 0.13696 0.11018 
French born abroad/French born in France      
Observed 0.11836 0.11046 0.06582 0.14055 0.05172 
Whole model 0.11493 0.08409 0.05941 0.10917 0.01840 
Distance only 0.08738 0.04045 0.01452 0.02671 0.02933 
Income only 0.06182 0.03424 0.03817 0.04979 0.00203 
Previous location only 0.05628 0.05853 0.05723 0.07449 0.04484 
Foreigners/French born abroad      
Observed 0.11055 0.11562 0.12364 0.17990 0.20150 
Whole model 0.10010 0.09682 0.09285 0.16276 0.17873 
Distance only 0.01828 0.05633 0.06823 0.09603 0.17637 
Income only 0.11084 0.09140 0.07404 0.13839 0.01273 
Previous location only 0.02789 0.02563 0.03889 0.06973 0.07151 
Foreigners/French born in France      
Observed 0.18387 0.19271 0.18646 0.30700 0.22270 
Whole model 0.18027 0.17861 0.15162 0.25624 0.19701 
Distance only 0.10567 0.09564 0.05696 0.06932 0.14704 
Income only 0.17184 0.12564 0.11221 0.18781 0.01071 
Previous location only 0.08096 0.08052 0.08858 0.14077 0.11577 
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Table 9: Observed dissimilarity indexes – averages for 37 urban areas 
 
 Mean Std Dev Min. Max. 
Social segregation     
Multi-group indexes      
Four groups
1
 0.1414 0.0277 0.0725 0.1906 
Five groups
2
 0.1426 0.0262 0.0801 0.1873 
Six groups
3
 0.1552 0.0290 0.0852 0.2284 
Two-groups indexes     
Executives/blue collars 0.2547 0.0807 0.1269 0.4244 
Executives/intermediate categ. 0.1503 0.0502 0.0673 0.3008 
Executives/white-collars 0.1893 0.0509 0.1050 0.2984 
Intermediate/blue collars 0.1548 0.0443 0.0605 0.2292 
Intermediate/white collars 0.1407 0.0335 0.0783 0.2360 
White collars/blue collars 0.1764 0.0486 0.0654 0.2956 
In labor force/out LF 0.1254 0.0359 0.0687 0.1969 
Ethnic segregation     
Multi-group index     
Three origin groups 0.1766 0.0559 0.0882 0.3172 
Binary indexes*     
French born abroad/born in Fr. 0.1560 0.0597 0.0517 0.2688 
Foreign/French born abroad 0.1868 0.0565 0.0799 0.2763 
Foreign/French born in France 0.2410 0.0641 0.1138 0.4098 
1
 The four groups are the following: executives, intermediate category, white-collars, blue-collars. 
 
2
 The five groups are the previous ones, plus the independent workers.
 
3
 The six groups are the previous ones, plus the out-of-labor force category. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Ratio of predicted over observed dissimilarity indexes – averages for 37 urban areas 
 
 Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Social segregation     
Multi-group indexes      
Four groups
1
 0.7160 0.1674 0.3097 1.0405 
Five groups
2
 0.7209 0.1499 0.3310 0.9834 
Six groups
3
 0.7952 0.1336 0.3337 0.9855 
Two-group indexes     
Executives/blue collars 0.7016 0.1993 0.2465 0.9783 
Executives/intermediate categ. 0.6441 0.2575 0.1344 1.0736 
Executives/white-collars 0.7636 0.2369 0.2152 1.1145 
Intermediate/blue collars 0.6881 0.2720 0.1932 1.2046 
Intermediate/white collars 0.7011 0.2062 0.2677 0.9766 
White collars/blue collars 0.7094 0.2595 0.3056 1.6982 
In labor force/out LF 0.7062 0.2260 0.1400 1.0717 
Ethnic segregation     
Multi-group index     
Three origin groups 0.6356 0.2078 0.1845 0.9890 
Two-group indexes*     
French born abroad/born in Fr. 0.5413 0.2341 0.2089 0.9710 
Foreign/French born abroad 0.7284 0.2581 0.2839 1.3347 
Foreign/French born in France 0.6788 0.2372 0.2033 1.0574 
1
 The four groups are the following: executives, intermediate category, white-collars, blue-collars. 
 
2
 The five groups are the previous ones, plus the independent workers.
 
3
 The six groups are the previous ones, plus the out-of-labor force category. 
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Table 11: Proportion of observed social segregation predicted by the partial models 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Four groups1     
Occupational status only 0.7268 0.1701 0.3097 1.0382 
Origin only 0.3189 0.0994 0.1347 0.5977 
Distance only 0.3639 0.2197 0.0682 0.9132 
Income only 0.4150 0.2595 2.14 E-15 0.9045 
Previous location only 0.3229 0.0951 0.1347 0.5941 
Five groups2     
Occupational status only 0.7323 0.1545 0.3310 0.9824 
Origin only 0.3185 0.0994 0.1448 0.5722 
Distance only 0.3663 0.2048 0.0631 0.7884 
Income only 0.3966 0.2476 2.35 E-15 0.8945 
Previous location only 0.3227 0.0947 0.1574 0.5698 
Six groups3     
Occupational status only 0.8010 0.1357 0.3337 0.9924 
Origin only 0.5180 0.1202 0.2755 0.7716 
Distance only 0.5813 0.1604 0.1177 0.9085 
Income only 0.5620 0.1996 0.0133 0.8884 
Previous location only 0.5202 0.1187 0.2921 0.7716 
Executives/blue collars     
Occupational status only 0.7092 0.2004 0.2502 0.9844 
Origin only 0.3934 0.1129 0.1425 0.7069 
Distance only 0.1590 0.1797 0.0027 0.7154 
Income only 0.5068 0.3587 3.43 E-15 1.3705 
Previous location only 0.3989 0.1104 0.1656 0.7027 
Executives/white-collars     
Occupation status only 0.7672 0.2342 0.2373 1.1121 
Origin only 0.3686 0.1448 0.1227 0.6460 
Distance only 0.4951 0.4573 0.0157 1.8095 
Income only 0.5879 0.4026 2.64E-15 1.2837 
Previous location only 0.3678 0.1456 0.1226 0.6484 
Executives/intermediate categ.     
Occupational status only 0.6447 0.2587 0.1322 1.0829 
Origin only 0.4119 0.1671 0.1617 0.8566 
Distance only 0.2124 0.2285 0.0007 1.1112 
Income only 0.4580 0.4600 3.30 E-15 1.5689 
Previous location only 0.4106 0.1669 0.1676 0.8566 
Intermediate categ./white-collars     
Occupational status only 0.6856 0.2709 0.1932 1.2117 
Origin only 0.2408 0.1170 0.0692 0.4808 
Distance only 0.5410 0.3971 0.0104 1.1425 
Income only 0.3515 0.3431 9.44 E-16 1.4135 
Previous location only 0.2388 0.1161 0.0692 0.4684 
Blue-collars/white-collars     
Occupational status only 0.7349 0.2732 0.3056 1.7863 
Origin only 0.2628 0.1353 0.0679 0.6472 
Distance only 0.5501 0.3377 0.1117 1.6159 
Income only 0.2276 0.2222 1.85E-15 0.7979 
Previous location only 0.2711 0.1328 0.0679 0.6547 
Intermediate categ./blue-collars     
Occupational status only 0.7197 0.2082 0.2677 0.9850 
Origin only 0.3398 0.1069 0.1444 0.5716 
Distance only 0.1889 0.1693 0.0140 0.7902 
Income only 0.4207 0.3351 2.37E-15 1.4252 
Previous location only 0.3481 0.1046 0.1455 0.6554 
In labor force/out of labor force     
Occupational status only 0.7010 0.2280 0.1471 1.0717 
Origin only 0.2580 0.1235 0.0775 0.5751 
Distance only 0.5686 0.2950 0.0517 1.2200 
Income only 0.2925 0.2871 9.42E-16 1.1941 
Previous location only 0.2532 0.1216 0.0700 0.5751 
1
 The four groups are the following: executives, intermediate category, white-collars, blue-collars. 
 
2
 The five groups are the previous ones, plus the independent workers.
 
3
 The six groups are the previous ones, plus the out-of-labor force category. 
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Table 12: Proportion of observed ethnic segregation predicted by the partial models 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Foreigners/French born 
abroad/French born in France 
    
Occupation status only 0.3767 0.1142 0.1490 0.6164 
Origin only 0.6419 0.1981 0.2278 1.0276 
Distance only 0.3481 0.2205 0.0355 0.8289 
Income only 0.2409 0.2689 3.80 E-14 0.8628 
Previous location only 0.4313 0.1153 0.1733 0.7010 
French born abroad/French born in 
France 
    
Occupation status only 0.3824 0.1449 0.1583 0.7341 
Origin only 0.5669 0.2258 0.1947 1.0580 
Distance only 0.2915 0.2536 0.0095 0.8417 
Income only 0.1148 0.1744 3.86E-14 0.5965 
Previous location only 0.4379 0.1585 0.1877 0.8694 
Foreign/French born abroad     
Occupation status only 0.4766 0.3125 0.0850 2.0262 
Origin only 0.5854 0.1944 0.2551 1.0211 
Distance only 0.5213 0.5573 0.0251 2.0379 
Income only 0.3716 0.3925 0 1.3362 
Previous location only 0.3853 0.1697 0.0894 0.8063 
Foreign/French born in France     
Occupation status only 0.3779 0.1260 0.1255 0.6753 
Origin only 0.6636 0.2064 0.2996 1.0021 
Distance only 0.3899 0.2595 0.0319 0.9831 
Income only 0.3157 0.3366 3.38E-14 1.1697 
Previous location only 0.4098 0.1132 0.1641 0.6426 
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